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This paper shows that buyers’ coordination failures might prevent entry in an industry with an incumbent firm 
and a more efficient potential entrant. If there was a single buyer, or if all buyers formed a central purchasing 
agency, coordination failures would be avoided and efficient entry would always occur. More generally, 
exclusion is the less likely the lower the number of buyers. For any given number of buyers, exclusion is the less 
likely the more fiercely buyers compete in the downstream market. First, intense competition may prevent 
miscoordination equilibria from arising; second, in cases where miscoordination equilibria still exist, it lowers 
the maximum price that the incumbent can sustain at such exclusionary equilibria. 
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   1 Introduction
Buyers have experienced increased concentration in many sectors, in particular
grocery retailing.1,2 This trend has triggered a wide debate on the eﬀects of
buyers power.3
We contribute to this debate by studying how concentration and competition
among buyers aﬀect the possibility of entry by a new upstream supplier in an
industry characterised by scale economies. In our model, buyers’ fragmentation
may lead to a situation where a new upstream ﬁrm does not manage to enter a
market, although endowed with lower marginal costs than an incumbent ﬁrm.
When several buyers decide independently from which supplier to purchase,
miscoordination equilibria may arise where all buyers buy from the incumbent
even if the entrant sets a lower price: if all buyers address the incumbent,
none of them has an incentive to deviate (that is, to switch to the entrant),
anticipating that a single order would not allow the entrant to cover its ﬁxed
costs. Therefore, entry would not follow and the deviant buyer could only go
back to the incumbent which would then charge a very high price.
However, miscoordination equilibria where entry is prevented are not unique.
There also exist equilibria where entry occurs because all buyers address the
supplier which oﬀers the lower price. Hence, the entrant will be able to capture
all buyers and to cover its entry cost.
In our model, entry may not occur at equilibrium due to buyers being unable
to coordinate their purchasing decisions. Hence, if there was a single buyer, or
if all buyers formed a central purchasing agency, miscoordination would be
avoided and eﬃcient entry would always occur. More generally, we show that
exclusion is the less likely the lower the number of buyers. Since the market
becomes less fragmented, ceteris paribus the demand generated by a deviant
buyer increases and it is more likely that entry supported by a single buyer is
proﬁtable. Hence, coordination failures are less likely to occur. The formation
of larger buyers, whose demand ensures that the supplier’s costs are covered,
may thus favour upstream entry.4
1Large retail chains play a dominant role in several countries, even though the phenomenon
is not uniform. For example, in the UK supermarkets accounted for 20 per cent of grocery
sales in 1960, but 89 per cent in 2002, with the top-5 stores controlling 67 per cent of all
sales. France exhibits similar features. In other countries, such as Italy and the US, small
independent retailers still retain a strong position in the market, although their position has
eroded over time. At the EU level, retailer concentration is further strengthened by purchasing
alliances (operating not only at national level but also cross-border). For an overview of recent
changes in the retail sector see Dobson and Waterson (1999), Dobson (2005) and OECD (1999).
2Buyers’ concentration has increased also in other industries such as healthcare, and cable
television (in the US). In the healthcare sector, buyers (drugstores, hospitals and HMOs)
aggregate into large procurement alliances in order to reduce prescription drug costs. See
Ellison and Snyder (2002) and DeGraba (2005). In cable television, the concern of excessive
buyer power of MSO (multiple system operators) is one of the reasons why the FTC has
enforced legal ownership restrictions. See Raskovich (2003) and Chae and Heidhues (2004).
3The growing concern about buyer power is documented in the Symposium on Buyer
Power and Antitrust, Antitrust Law Journal (2005). See also Dobson and Waterson (1999),
Rey (2000) and the reports by OECD (1999), FTC (2001), EC (1999).
4Also Raskovich (2003) considers industries where scale economies are important, ﬁxed
costs are sunk after buyers’ decisions, and where a large buyer can be pivotal to the supplier’s
1For any given number of buyers in the industry, we also show that the scope
for miscoordination equilibria depends crucially on how ﬁercely buyers compete
in the downstream market (in our model, tougher competition is modelled as an
increase in the degree of substitutability among the ﬁnal products sold by down-
stream ﬁrms-buyers; equivalently, it could also be thought as an increase in the
integration of downstream markets, i.e. due to a reduction in transport costs
across markets where buyers operate). Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that the toughness
of downstream competition has two main eﬀects: ﬁrst, it can prevent miscoordi-
nation equilibria from arising; second, in cases where miscoordination equilibria
still exist, it lowers the maximum price that the incumbent can sustain at such
exclusionary equilibria.
More precisely, miscoordination equilibria where the entrant supplier is ex-
cluded and buyers pay the monopoly price to the incumbent may occur only for
weak downstream market competition; for intermediate levels of downstream
competition, miscoordination may occur but only at a price below the monopoly
level (and the ﬁercer competition the lower the maximum price that the incum-
bent can sustain); whereas miscoordination never occurs for ﬁerce downstream
competition. Indeed, if downstream competition is strong enough, buying the
input at a lower price from the entrant would allow a deviant buyer to get a
very large share of the downstream market. In turn, this raises its demand for
the entrant’s good, thereby making the deviant buyer pivotal and triggering
entry.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on buyer power,5 in particular
to the branch which studies whether wholesale discounts obtained by more
powerful buyers are passed on to ﬁnal consumers. In particular, Von Ungern-
Sternberg (1996) and Dobson and Waterson (1997) show that price discounts
obtained by more concentrated buyers translate into lower ﬁnal-good prices only
if the buyer-retailer market is characterized by ﬁerce competition (e.g. because
product diﬀerentiation is low) and thus double marginalization is not severe.6
decision to produce. However, the focus of his paper is diﬀerent from ours: it analyses a
setting where buyers simultaneously engage in bilateral negotiations with the supplier, and
shows that being pivotal can be a disadvantage for a large buyer because it deteriorates its
bargaining position.
5Galbraith (1952) was the ﬁrst to emphasise the countervailing power of large buyers. There
is by now a vast economic literature on buyer power. A rich stream of papers explains why
larger buyers obtain price discounts from sellers (See Snyder, 2005, for a recent survey): (i)
they can credibly threaten to integrate backwards, thereby improving their bargaining position
with the supplier (Kats, 1987; Inderst and Wey, 2005b); (ii) they can intensify competition
among potential suppliers (Inderst and Shaﬀer (forthcoming)); (iii) they negotiate over larger
quantities, which represents a strategic advantage when aggregate surplus is concave in quan-
tities (Chipty and Snyder, 1999; Inderst and Wey 2003, 2005a; Chae and Heidhues, 2004);
(iv) they destabilize collusion (Snyder 1996 and Tyagi 2001). Another (recent) stream of pa-
pers studies the impact of buyer power on upstream incentives to innovate. Inderst and Wey
(2003, 2005a, 2005b) show that downstream mergers may strengthen suppliers’ incentives to
adopt technologies with lower marginal costs, thereby raising consumer surplus and total wel-
fare. Instead, Inderst and Shaﬀer (forthcoming) shows that buyer power may decrease welfare
through a distortion in the supplier’s choice of variety.
6Another paper belonging to this part of the literature is Chen (2003) which shows that an
exogenous increase in the relative bargaining power of a dominant retailer beneﬁts consumers
because it triggers a decrease in the whosale price charged by the supplier to the fringe
2In our paper, instead, there is no welfare gain from buyers’ concentration
when competition is strong enough, since miscoordination does not arise. Down-
stream competition pushes buyers to look for cheaper inputs and allows the
most eﬃcient buyer to get a large downstream market. Hence, the entrant gets
enough demand to cover ﬁxed costs and enters. It is only when downstream
competition is weak that buyers’ concentration, by solving the miscoordination
problem, might beneﬁt ﬁnal consumers. The diﬀerence in the results obtained
can be explained by noting that while in the above mentioned papers the mar-
ket structure is given, in ours it is not: ﬁerce downstream competition triggers
entry.
Another branch of literature related to our analysis consists of the exclusive
dealing models by Rasmusen, Ramseyer and Wiley (1991), Segal and Whinston
(2000). In these papers, an incumbent uses exclusive contracts to proﬁtably
deter eﬃcient entry, thereby reducing economic welfare. When the incumbent
simultaneously oﬀers exclusivity contracts to all buyers, exclusion arises because
it exploits the buyers’ lack of coordination on their most preferred continuation
equilibrium. For some aspects the reader will ﬁnd a strong similarity between
our paper and those. However, Rasmusen et al. (1991) and Segal and Whinston
(2000) focus on the ability of the incumbent to deter entry by using exclusionary
contracts, whereas in our setting buyers’ fragmentation may deter entry without
the incumbent playing an active role in it. These diﬀerent approaches translate
into a diﬀerent timing of the games. In Rasmusen et al. (1991) and Segal
and Whinston (2000) it is the incumbent ﬁrm that has a ﬁrst mover advantage
and can oﬀer (exclusionary) contracts. We assume, instead, that in the ﬁrst
stage the incumbent ﬁrm and the entrant simultaneously post their price bids.
Clearly, our setting is more realistic if exclusive dealing clauses are outlawed
(else, one might expect the incumbent to have a ﬁrst mover advantage in the
choice of contracts).7
The importance of downstream competition in determining the emergence of
entry v. exclusionary equilibria was already identiﬁed by Fumagalli and Motta
(forthcoming) in the context of exclusive dealing models: we showed there that
exclusive dealing does not deter entry if downstream competition is very ﬁerce.
In a diﬀerent setting, we conﬁrm here the crucial role that downstream competi-
tion plays: in both cases, when competition is ﬁerce, a deviant buyer would steal
a larger market share to its rivals, thereby increasing the number of units of the
input demanded, and attracting entry by oﬀering enough scale to the entrant.
However, in the present paper downstream competition has richer implications,
in particular by showing that even when it does not prevent exclusionary equi-
libria from arising, downstream competition may still aﬀect the price that the
competitors, thereby leading to lower ﬁnal prices. In spite of this, total welfare may decrease
because more production is allocated to the less eﬃcient fringe competitors.
7Assuming that a monopolistic incumbent cannot resort to exclusive deals with buyers is
far from being unrealistic. In most countries, anti-trust laws prevent dominant ﬁrms from
using exclusive contracts unless they involve a minor proportion of buyers. See for instance
the US v. Microsoft case in the US (US Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, Case
5212, June 28, 2001) and the ice-cream case in the EU (Langnese-Iglo v. Commission, Case
T-7/93 [1995] and Sch¨ oller v. Commission, Case T-7/93 [1995]).
3incumbent can sustain (in our previous paper, buyers’ competition can aﬀect
equilibrium prices only if it breaks the exclusionary equilibrium).8
The paper is organised in the following way. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 analyses the case where buyers are independent monopolists in order
to clarify why coordination failures may prevent eﬃcient entry. Section 4 analy-
ses the role of downstream competition in solving (or alleviating) coordination
failures. Section 5 draws some policy implications and concludes the paper.
2 The model
We consider n ≥ 2 identical downstream ﬁrms that sell a diﬀerentiated good to
ﬁnal consumers, and that need a homogeneous good as an input. Downstream
production requires the intermediate product in ﬁxed proportion to output,
which we normalize to one. Moreover, the only cost for downstream buyers is
the cost of the input.
These downstream ﬁrms-buyers simultaneously solicit bids from two up-
stream ﬁrms competing for the provision of the input. One of them, ﬁrm I, is
an incumbent in the industry and has already paid its entry cost. The other,
ﬁrm E, is a potential entrant. If it actually enters the industry, it will have to
pay the ﬁxed sunk cost F.
Upstream production displays constant marginal cost and the potential en-
trant (whose marginal cost is normalized to zero) is more eﬃcient than the
incumbent: cE = 0 < cI. For simplicity (and without loss of generality) we
assume that cI < 1/3. This condition: (i) is suﬃcient for the entrant not to
enjoy a “drastic” advantage over the incumbent, i.e. for its monopoly price
to be larger than the marginal cost of the incumbent; (ii) allows to keep the
analysis as simple as possible by ensuring that equilibrium quantities in the
ﬁnal market are always positive.
To make the analysis interesting, we assume that F is small enough for
entry to be proﬁtable if ﬁrm E serves all the customers (at the price cI, which
is the price that would prevail absent miscoordination issues), and that F is
suﬃciently large for entry to be unproﬁtable when the entrant is addressed by
a single buyer and downstream ﬁrms are independent monopolists. The above








To ensure that this interval it is not empty, we impose that cI > (1/2)(1 − p
1 − 1/n).
The timing of the game is as follows (see Figure 1 for an illustration). At
time t1, the two upstream ﬁrms take part in the (simultaneous) auctions and
8The eﬀect of downstream competition is also neater in the present setting. Indeed, in an
exclusive dealing setting, it is conceivable that downstream competition may favor - rather
than hindering - exclusion because it destroys buyers’ proﬁts and therefore may allow the
incumbent to induce buyers to accept exclusivity behind a low compensatory oﬀer. Such an










Buyers not served 
by E buy from I 
Competition in 
the final market 
t3 t4 t5
Figure 1: Time-line.
submit the price wi (with i = I,E) at which they are willing to supply the
good.9 They cannot price discriminate among buyers, i.e. they will oﬀer the
same conditions to each buyer.10
At time t2, each buyer decides from which seller to buy, after having observed
the bids. We assume that the agreement between a buyer and a seller at t2 is
binding; in particular, once decided to patronize the incumbent, a buyer cannot
change its decision in the following periods when it observes if the potential
entrant actually provides the good. In other words, a contract is signed at
this stage between the buyer, which commits to buy the good at the agreed
upon price, and the chosen provider, which commits to provide the good at the
agreed upon price.
At time t3 the entrant observes the number of buyers S which accepted its
bid and decides whether it wants to enter (and pay the ﬁxed sunk cost F).11,12
At time t4 buyers not served by the entrant have the possibility to buy from
the incumbent.
At time t5 buyers compete in the ﬁnal market.
Final consumers are assumed to have the following utility function, due to
9For simplicity, we assume that upstream ﬁrms use linear tariﬀs. The results would not
change qualitatively with two-part tariﬀs.
10Price discrimination would complicate the model without bringing additional insight to
the analysis. Note, however, that we allow for price discrimination by the incumbent across
periods: if a buyer addresses the incumbent in a later period, it can charge a diﬀerent price.
11Examples of industries where ﬁxed costs are sunk after buyers’ decision are the follow-
ing: cable television, where start-up cables networks typically obtain carriage commitments
from a number of cable multiple system operators prior to sinking substantial costs into net-
work launch (see Higgins, 1997); motion picture, where big-budget projects typically secure a
good distribution deal before moving the project forward to production (see Goldberg, 1997);
the airplane and railway industries, where a manufacturer may require a suﬃciently large
number of buyers in order to move into a new area of activity and propose a potential new
airframe/train system.
12There exist at least two reasons why the entrant cannot sink the ﬁxed cost and cannot
credibly commit to entry before taking part in the auctions. First, the market can materialize
before any commitment can be done by the entrant, for instance when buyers invite tenders
for orders and producing for the order takes time; alternatively selling in a foreign market
may require investments to adapt an existing product to country speciﬁc technical standards.
Second, the entrant might be ﬁnancially constrained and can borrow from outside investors
only if obtains enough contracts from buyers (see the working paper version for a possible
formalization).





















where qi is the quantity of the i-th product, n is the number of products in
the industry, µ ∈ [0,∞) represents the degree of substitutability between the n
products.
From the maximisation of the utility function subject to the income con-
straint, one can obtain the inverse demand functions:










We assume for simplicity that all buyers have a discount factor equal to
one. We look for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies of
this game, and we solve it by backward induction.
In the next Section we will focus on the extreme case where buyers are
independent monopolists and therefore do not interact in the downstream mar-
ket (which corresponds to µ = 0). This will clarify why coordination failures
among buyers can prevent eﬃcient entry. We will then show why and when
downstream competition can eliminate or mitigate the problem.
3 Independent downstream monopolists
At time t5, given the price wi it pays for the input, buyer i sells optimally
q(wi) = (1 − wi)/2n.
At time t4, buyers not served by the entrant purchase the input from the
incumbent, which charges the price wm
I = argmax{(wI − cI)(1 − wI)/2n} =
(1 + cI)/2.
At time t3, the entrant observes how many buyers have accepted its bid
and, conditional on having oﬀered a price wE, it anticipates the quantities they
will buy from it and the proﬁts it will realize. It will enter if and only if its





Condition 3 identiﬁes an integer N∗ such that ﬁrm E enters if and only if the
number of buyers that accepted its bid is strictly larger than N∗. Speciﬁcally,







13See Motta (2004: chapter 8) for a discussion. The main advantage of demand functions
derived from this utility function is that, at given prices, market size does not vary either with
the degree of substitutability or the number of products, a crucial property when - like in the
present paper - we are interested in doing comparative statics on these parameters. Of course,
consumer preferences can be expressed as V = U(q1,..,qi,..qn) + y, where y is a composite
good, so that a partial equilibrium analysis is fully justiﬁed.
6Note that, by assumption (A1), the demand of a single buyer is never large




At time t2, given the bids made by upstream ﬁrms, buyers simultaneously
choose their supplier. Their choices are described by Lemma 1. The crucial
point highlighted by Lemma 1 is that bidding a lower price than the incumbent
does not guarantee that the entrant will be patronized by all buyers. Indeed,
when wE < wI and wI ≤ wm
I the continuation equilibrium where S = N is
not unique. There exist also equilibria where buyers fail to coordinate and the
entrant does not receive enough orders to proﬁtably enter the market. To see
why focus on the case where all buyers patronize the incumbent (S = 0). This
is an equilibrium. A single buyer knows that its order alone does not trigger
entry. Thus, should it deviate and address the entrant, its order would remain
unfulﬁlled and it should resort to the incumbent at a later stage, paying the
monopoly price wm
I . Since wI ≤ wm
I the buyer has no incentive to deviate.
Instead coordination failures do not occur when wE < wI and wI > wm
I .
Now choosing the entrant is a dominant strategy for any buyer: it will pay
a lower price both if entry follows (wE < wI) and if entry does not occur
and it will buy the good later from the incumbent (wm
I < wI). The unique
continuation equilibrium is such that all buyers address ﬁrm E.
Lemma 1 For given wI and wE, the number of buyers S which address the
entrant in equilibrium is given by the following table:
wI < wm
I wI = wm










any S S ≥ N∗
wE > wI S = 0 S ≤ N∗ S = N∗
Proof. See Appendix.
3.2 Upstream ﬁrms’ bids
At time t1 upstream producers take part in the simultaneous auctions. Not
surprisingly, there exist equilibria (entry equilibria) where ﬁrm E bids a price
equal to the incumbent’s marginal cost (or a lower price) and receives enough
orders to cover its entry cost. However, there exist also equilibria (no-entry
equilibria) where the incumbent bids a price above cI - even the monopoly
price - and is chosen by all buyers. Thus, the more eﬃcient producer does
not enter the market. Why does not the entrant deviate and undercut the
incumbent? The reason is that undercutting the incumbent does not allow ﬁrm
7E to attract all the orders and to cover the entry costs. In turn, this occurs
because at any possible price bid by ﬁrm E individual demand is insuﬃcient
to trigger entry. As shown by Lemma 1, this creates the scope for coordination
failures where all buyers choose the incumbent even though the entrant bids a
lower price.
Formally, we have the following.
Proposition 1 When downstream ﬁrms are independent monopolists and buy-
















I), S ∈ (0,N∗).
• Entry equilibria
where w∗
E ∈ (cE,cI], w∗
I ∈ [w∗
E,wm
I ], S = N;
w∗
E = w∗
I = cI, S ∈ (N∗,N).
(The price cE is such that cEnq(cE) = F.)
Proof. See Appendix.
3.3 Perfectly Coalition Proof Nash Equilibria
Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 show that exclusion of the more eﬃcient producer
occurs because the entrant cannot successfully undercut the incumbent. This
is entirely due to coordination failures among buyers and would not occur if
they could agree to jointly address their orders to the entrant. Similarly, no
coordination failure would arise if all the demand was concentrated in a single
buyer.
This idea can be developed more formally applying the concept of Coalition-
Proof Nash Equilibria to the continuation game where buyers take their deci-
sion. A continuation equilibrium is coalition-proof if no coalition of any size can
deviate in a way that increases the payoﬀs of all its members. Note that the
coalitional deviations must be Nash Equilibria of the game among the deviating
players, holding the strategies of the others ﬁxed.14
Remark 1 If wE < wI, there exists only one continuation equilibrium which is
Coalition-Proof. This is the continuation equilibrium where all buyers address
the potential entrant.
Proof. Any continuation equilibrium of the type S < N following wE < wI
is not Coalition-Proof: a joint deviation in which the N − S buyers reject the
incumbent’s oﬀer would allow the entrant to provide the good and the buyers to
14See Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston (1987).
8obtain it at a lower price. Obviously, no buyer has an incentive to deviate from
such a coalitional deviation. Vice versa, no subset of buyers has an incentive
to jointly deviate from S = 0 as they would be charged a higher price. This
continuation equilibrium is Coalition-Proof, and it is the unique one.
In order to investigate the role of downstream competition in facilitating
entry, in the rest of the paper we will focus on the case where buyers are not
able to coordinate.
4 Buyers competing in the downstream market
In this Section we consider downstream ﬁrms-buyers which compete in the
downstream market. Speciﬁcally, Section 4.1 assumes that buyers sell diﬀeren-
tiated products (i.e. µ > 0) and compete ` a la Cournot in the ﬁnal market.15
We will show that the more substitutable the ﬁnal products - and therefore the
tougher downstream competition - the less likely exclusion of the more eﬃcient
producer. Section 4.2 will then deal with the case of price competition with
homogeneous goods.
4.1 Cournot competitors
As we know from Section 3, the existence of no-entry equilibria where all buyers
pay the price wI to the incumbent relies on the fact that, due to coordination
failures, the entrant has no incentive to undercut the incumbent. What is
crucial for this to happen is that at any wE < wI a single buyer does not
generate enough input demand to attract entry. Hence, in order to identify the
conditions that allow for exclusion, we now study the proﬁt of ﬁrm E when it
is selected by a single buyer. We shall show that if downstream competition is
ﬁerce enough, there exists at least an input price w
0
E < wI such that a single
buyer paying that price (while the remaining buyers pay wI) would sell enough
units of the product to make it proﬁtable for ﬁrm E to enter the market. This
implies that, following such bids, coordination failures do not occur. Hence,
no-entry equilibria where all buyers pay the price wI to the incumbent do not
exist. The entrant would have an incentive to deviate and bid w
0
E as this would
allow to capture all buyers.
Speciﬁcally, let upstream ﬁrms bid wI and wE. Also, let all buyers but one
address the incumbent and suppose that entry occurs. Finally, let π∗d
E be the
largest proﬁt (gross of the ﬁxed cost) that the entrant makes when it undercuts
the incumbent and supplies the deviant buyer only:
π∗d




15The assumption of Cournot competition avoids dealing with several subcases and with
discontinuities that occur under price competition and asymmetric costs. Hence it allows
to study the scope for coordination failures as a function of µ while keeping the analysis as
simple as possible. Note that assuming Bertrand competition would not change the nature of
the results. See Section 4.2 for the extreme case where downstream ﬁrms sell homogeneous
products.
9where q∗
d(wE,wI,µ,n) denotes the equilibrium quantity sold by the deviant
buyer in the ﬁnal market. Lemma 2 studies π∗d
E as a function of the price wI
paid by the n−1 non-deviant buyers, of the intensity of downstream competition
(measured by the degree of substitutability µ among the ﬁnal products), and
of the number of buyers n.
Lemma 2 π∗d
E (wI,µ,n) is (i) strictly increasing in the intensity of downstream
competition µ; (ii) strictly increasing in the price paid by the non-deviant buyers
wI; (iii) strictly decreasing in the number of buyers n.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind Lemma 2 is the following. Firstly (i), as ﬁnal products
become more similar and thus downstream competition intensiﬁes, the deviant
buyer sells more and more in the ﬁnal market. Indeed, tougher downstream
competition decreases equilibrium prices in the ﬁnal market and therefore in-
creases aggregate demand. On top of this, tougher downstream competition
intensiﬁes the “business stealing”eﬀect. The deviant buyer uses a cheaper in-
put than rivals and has a lower marginal cost. The tougher downstream com-
petition the stronger the competitive advantage that being more eﬃcient than
rivals provides. Hence, the deviant buyer captures a larger share of the in-
creased market demand. In turn, this raises its input demand and increases the
proﬁts that the entrant makes when it supplies the deviant buyer only.
Secondly (ii), the higher the price bid by the incumbent the less eﬃcient
the non-deviant buyers. Hence, for given wE, the deviant buyer sells more in
the downstream market. This makes it more proﬁtable for ﬁrm E to undercut
the incumbent when it is selected by the deviant buyer only.
Finally (iii), when the number of downstream ﬁrms increases, there are
two forces at work. On the one hand, the larger the number of downstream
competitors the lower the equilibrium prices in the ﬁnal market and thus the
larger aggregate demand. On the other hand, any given aggregate demand
must be split among a larger number of ﬁrms. Lemma 2 establishes that the
latter eﬀect is stronger. Thus, as n increases, market fragmentation becomes
more severe, the input demand generated by the deviant buyer decreases and
so does the entrant’s proﬁt.
Lemma 2 has shown that the tougher downstream competition (i.e. the
higher µ) the more proﬁtable to serve one buyer only. Lemma 3 shows that
suﬃciently intense competition may allow the entrant to cover the entry costs
when it undercuts the incumbent and supplies one buyer only.
Lemma 3 There exist a threshold level b cI of the incumbent’s marginal costs
and a threshold level b F of the entry cost such that the following cases arise:
Case I: cI > b cI and F ∈ [F, b F).
There exist µ∗(n,F) and µ∗∗(n,F), with µ∗∗(n,F) > µ∗(n,F) such that:
• if µ ≤ µ∗(n,F), then π∗d
E (wI,µ,n) ≤ F for any wI ≤ wm
I .
• if µ∗(n,F) < µ ≤ µ∗∗(n,F), there exists a price wex
I (µ,n,F) ∈ [cI,wm
I )
such that π∗d
E (wI,µ,n) ≤ F iﬀ wI ≤ wex
I .
10• if µ > µ∗∗(n,F) then π∗d
E (wI,µ,n) > F for any wI ≥ cI.




or cI > b cI and F ∈ [b F,F].
There exists µ∗(n,F) such that:
• if µ ≤ µ∗(n,F), then π∗d
E (wI,µ,n) ≤ F for any wI ≤ wm
I .
• if µ > µ∗(n,F), then there exists a price wex
I (µ,n,F) ∈ [cI,wm
I ) such that
π∗d
E (wI,µ,n) ≤ F iﬀ wI ≤ wex
I
The price wex
I is decreasing in µ.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 3 distinguishes two cases. In Case I, the eﬃciency gap between the
incumbent and the entrant is suﬃciently large and the entry cost is suﬃciently
low. In this case, intense downstream competition (µ > µ∗∗) eliminates coor-
dination failures entirely. If products are highly substitutable, by obtaining a
cheaper input from the entrant a single buyer can steal a lot of business from its
rivals. Hence, for any price wI ≥ cI bid by the incumbent, the largest (gross)
proﬁts the the entrant make -when it undercuts the incumbent and supplies
one buyer only- cover the entry costs. In other words, for any wI ≥ cI, there
exists at least a price w0
E < wI such that entry supported by a single buyer is
proﬁtable.
This implies that, following these bids, a continuation equilibrium where all
the buyers address the incumbent does not exist. Any buyer is now pivotal
and has the incentive to deviate unilaterally because it anticipates that entry
will follow. Hence, the entrant can successfully undercut any price above cI
and the incumbent can never rely on coordination failures to sustain no-entry
equilibria with proﬁtable prices. In turn prices such that coordination failures
might occur and prevent entry entail losses for the incumbent. As a result,
equilibria where ﬁrm E does not enter the market do not exist.
For intermediate intensity of competition (µ ∈ (µ∗,µ∗∗]), the largest (gross)
proﬁts the the entrant make -when it undercuts the incumbent and supplies




I ). If the incumbent bids a lower price, single-buyer entry
is unproﬁtable at any wE < wI. Hence, the incumbent can take advantage of
coordination failures but only if it does not bid too high. No-entry equilibria
exist and the maximum price that can be supported in these equilibria decreases
as downstream competition intensiﬁes (i.e. as µ increases).
Finally, when downstream competition is very weak (µ ≤ µ∗), even if the
incumbent bids the monopoly price, at any wE < wI a single buyer is insuﬃcient
to trigger entry. In this region, buyers sell products that are distant substitutes
to each other. Hence, obtaining a cheaper input does not allow the deviant
buyer to steal much of the rivals’ business and to generate an input demand
suﬃciently large to make entry proﬁtable. As a consequence, coordination
failures support no-entry equilibria where all buyers pay the price wI ∈ [cI,wm
I ]
to the incumbent.
11In Case II (which corresponds to either a smaller eﬃciency gap or a larger
entry cost) intense downstream competition is not enough to entirely eliminate
coordination failures. Even when ﬁnal products are homogeneous (i.e. when
µ → ∞), there exist some prices wI ≥ cI that the incumbent can bid such that
at any wE < wI single-buyer entry is not proﬁtable. Hence, no-entry equilibria
exist even when downstream competition is the toughest. Still, it remains true
that, for ﬁerce enough competition, the maximum price that can be sustained
at no entry equilibria decreases with µ.
Proposition 2 summarizes the above discussion and describes the type of
equilibria as a function of the intensity of downstream competition (see also
Figure 2).
Proposition 2 The tougher downstream competition: (i) the less likely ex-
clusion of the more eﬃcient producer and (ii) the lower the price that can be
sustained at no entry equilibria, if they exist.
Case I: cI > b cI and F < b F.
1. if downstream competition is weak (µ ≤ µ∗), both no-entry equilibria
and entry equilibria exist. The maximum price that can be sustained in
no-entry equilibria is wm
I .
2. if the intensity of downstream competition is intermediate (µ ∈ (µ∗,µ∗∗]),
both no-entry equilibria and entry equilibria exist. The maximum
price that can be sustained in no-entry equilibria is wex
I ∈ [cI,wm
I ).
3. if downstream competition is tough (µ > µ∗∗), only entry equilibria
exist.




or cI > b cI and F ≥ b F.
Both no-entry equilibria and entry equilibria exist for any µ. However,
1. if competition is weak (µ ≤ µ∗), the maximum price that can be sustained
in no-entry equilibria is wm
I .
2. if competition is stronger (µ > µ∗), the maximum price that can be sus-
tained in no-entry equilibria is wex
I ∈ [cI,wm
I ).
Proof. It follows directly from Lemma 3.
In the analysis above the intensity of downstream competition is measured
by the degree of substitutability among ﬁnal products. However, competition
intensiﬁes also if a larger number of ﬁrms compete in the downstream market
(for any given degree of substitutability). As shown by Lemma 2, an increase in
n has the additional eﬀect of making the downstream market more fragmented.
The latter eﬀect dominates so that, ceteris paribus, the input demand generated
by the deviant buyer decreases as n increases, which in turn makes single-buyer
entry less proﬁtable.
Therefore, as more ﬁrms populate the downstream market, the regions with
no-entry equilibria expand (see Figure 2). Moreveor, for any given µ, the max-
imum price that can be supported at no-entry equilibria (when this price is
below the monopoly price) increases. This is stated by Lemma 4:
12 
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Figure 2: Maximum price supported at no-entry equilibria. Solid line: n buyers;
dashed line: n0 > n buyers.
13Lemma 4 An increase in the number of downstream buyers makes market frag-
mentation more severe and exclusion more likely: the thresholds µ∗ and µ∗∗ and
the maximum price wex
I are increasing in n.
Proof. See Appendix.
4.2 Undiﬀerentiated Bertrand Competitors
In the previous section, the assumption of Cournot competitors limits the tough-
ness of competition in the downstream market. For this reason, in some cases
coordination failures persist even when downstream ﬁrms sell homogeneous
products.
Imagine, instead, that downstream ﬁrms compete in prices. When ﬁnal
products are homogeneous, using a cheaper input than rivals provides the
strongest competitive advantage. A slightly lower marginal cost allows to un-
dercut all rivals and capture the entire ﬁnal market. This implies that for any
price wI ≥ cI bid by the incumbent, the entrant can always ﬁnd a lower price
such that single buyer entry is proﬁtable. By bidding that price the entrant





, no-entry equilibria do not exist.
Proposition 3 When downstream ﬁrms are undiﬀerentiated Bertrand com-
petitors, only entry equilibria exist.
Proof. See Appendix.
This conﬁrms that the results obtained do not depend on the mode of down-
stream competition, and suggests that if competition was ﬁercer (for given num-
ber of ﬁrms and degree of substitutability) in the sense of switching to a tougher
mode of competition, exclusion would be less likely; and if exclusion did persist,
the prices that could be sustained at no-entry equilibria would be lower.
5 Policy Implications and conclusive remarks
This paper has showed that, unless downstream competition is very ﬁerce, frag-
mented buyers may suﬀer from coordination failures, thereby preventing entry
of a more eﬃcient producer.
Hence, it provides a justiﬁcation for anti-trust agencies when they argue
that buyers’ fragmentation may undermine the competitive pressure exerted
by potential entrants in the upstream market, thereby making increased con-
centration in that market more dangerous. For instance, in a recent case, the
European Commission approved the joint venture between the rail technology
subsidiaries of Asea Brown Boveri (ABB) and Daimler-Benz in the German
national trains market but not in the local train and systems market. The only
client for mainline trains was the national railways company Deutsche Bahn
which, according to the Commission, could invite tenders for several orders
at the same time. Facing very large orders, foreign ﬁrms would be willing to
14incur the ﬁxed costs of changing their product speciﬁcations to meet the Ger-
man technical standards. In the local market, instead, train and system buyers
consist of 58 diﬀerent German municipal transport companies. Since their in-
dividual orders have much smaller size, the ﬁxed costs of adapting to German
speciﬁcations would not be worth incurring for foreign ﬁrms providers.16
Coordination failures would not occur if buyers could agree to jointly ad-
dress their orders to the entrant. Hence, the formation of central purchasing
agencies (or of purchasing alliances), which pool individual orders of indepen-
dent buyers that still behave non-cooperatively in the downstream market, is
welfare beneﬁcial. By favouring eﬃcient entry, it would lead to lower input
prices without aﬀecting the price-cost margin in the ﬁnal market.
Coordination failures are also unlikely if competition in the downstream
market is suﬃciently intense. Therefore, if it were possible for a governmental
agency to intervene in the market in such a way as to make downstream com-
petition tougher, for instance reducing switching costs or increasing integration
among national markets, this would also solve (or alleviate) the miscoordiation
problem.
But suppose that the authorities do not have the means to intervene so
as to intensify market competition. Lemma 4 shows that the formation of
less fragmented buyers (for instance through mergers or acquisitions) makes
exclusion less likely. It is then legitimate to ask whether concentration in the
downstream market would help or not.
First, there exists no welfare gain from buyers’ concentration when down-
stream competition is strong enough. Coordination failures do not arise and
increased concentration, by enhancing market power, would be welfare detri-
mental.
When instead downstream competition is not suﬃciently strong, the mul-
tiplicity of equilibria does not authorise sharp conclusions. Even in the re-
gions where they are equilibria, no-entry equilibria are not unique. In fact, the
equilibria where entry occurs always exist. In other words, favouring higher
downstream concentration in general, on the grounds that it would eliminate
or alleviate coordination failures, forgets that miscoordination might arise as
well as not. There should be serious indications that coordination failures are
under way, in order to allow, or promote, concentration downstream.
Further, increased concentration in the downstream market produces a
trade-oﬀ between solving coordination failures and enhancing market power
that we illustrate next. For the sake of the argument, suppose that no-entry
equilibria are the actual outcome whenever they are possible equilibria and
suppose too that miscoordination results in the highest feasible price for the
incumbent (for instance, wI = wm
I when µ ≤ µ∗ and wI = wex
I when µ > µ∗).17
16Case ABB/Daimler Benz, IV/M.580, 18.10.1996. See Motta (2004), Section 5.7.3 for a
description. Also in the case Enso/Stora, IV/M.1225, the EC has maintained that a large
buyer may trigger the development of new capacity in the upstream market, thereby limiting
the market power eﬀect of a merger. See the Oﬃcial Journal of the EC, L254 (1999), paragraph
91 and “Buyer power and the Enso/Stora decision”, NERA Competition Brief (November
1999)
17This would be the case if we used Pareto dominance (on the supplier side) to select among
15Two eﬀects are at play here. The ﬁrst is the marginal cost eﬀect: if more con-
centration avoids or alleviates coordination failures, it also reduces the price at
which the buyers are supplied. Since this is their marginal cost, it also tends to
reduce ﬁnal prices. The second is the market power eﬀect. Given marginal cost,
the lower the number of buyers the higher their ﬁnal prices. Hence, downstream
concentration will result in cheaper supplies when the eﬀect of the savings in
the input cost is stronger than the market power eﬀect. For instance, in the
extreme case where downstream markets are independent and thus the market
power eﬀect is absent, concentration is welfare improving whenever it leads to
lower input prices.
These results appear somehow in contrast with previous work on the welfare
eﬀects of buyer power. Von Ungern-Sternberg (1996) and Dobson and Waterson
(1997) ﬁnd that buyer concentration improves welfare only insofar as there is
enough competition in the downstream market, for it is only when buyers-
retailers do not have enough market power that lower prices would be passed
on to ﬁnal consumers. The contrast in the results is mainly due to the fact that
in their models there is only one upstream ﬁrm and concentration helps buyers
gain bargaining power and win better supply terms. Upstream market structure
is given in their papers. In our paper, instead, we have showed that downstream
competition aﬀects the structure of the upstream market, and facilitates entry.
Although the coordination issue studied in this model might be rather speciﬁc,
we believe that the main force behind our results is general. If there exists
strong competition downstream, buyers will shop around for better deals from
suppliers, thereby jeopardising upstream market power.
The multiplicity of equilibria which characterizes this paper makes it diﬃ-
cult to draw clear-cut policy implications. An interesting extension would be to
formalize our problem as a global game in order to determine a unique equilib-
rium outcome.18 However, this would not be a standard application of existing
work (in particular, the fact that at the ﬁrst stage two agents simultaneously
post prices makes the analysis quite complex) and is left for future research.
More generally, it would be interesting to study how buyers form beliefs on
the behaviour of other buyers, and which actions can be taken by the entrant
and the incumbent) in order to inﬂuence the formation of such beliefs and
determine coordination on a particular equilibrium outcome.
the equilibria of the same type.
18Models of speculative attacks typically give rise to multiple equilibria. Similar to the logic
of our paper, attacks occur or not depending on the agents’ expectations about what other
agents will do. Morris and Shin (1998) reformulate the problem by assuming that individuals
have a common prior and noisy private information about a state of the world, and show that
uncertainty will induce a unique equilibrium corresponding to each state of the world. In our
model, one could let buyers have private signals on a given state of the world (the degree of
competition, or - perhaps better - the ﬁxed costs of the entrant) and try to apply the same
logic as in Morris and Shin (1998). However, we are also interested in modelling the choices of
the suppliers, and this inevitably complicates the model, since suppliers’ actions would carry
signals to buyers. See also Morris and Shin (2003) for a recent survey on the literature on
global games.
16A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
1. Consider wE < wI.
S = N is an equilibrium. Entry follows. By deviating and addressing the incumbent,
any single buyer would pay a higher price.
No equilibrium exists where S ∈ [N
∗,N). A buyer addressing ﬁrm I would always
prefer to switch to the entrant (which receives enough orders to enter and thus will
provide the good) paying a lower price (wE < wI).
If wI > w
m
I no equilibrium exists where S ∈ [0,N
∗). Any buyer choosing the incumbent
has an incentive to deviate. By deviating the buyer does not expect to attract entry.




If wI ≤ w
m
I , S = 0 is an equilibrium. By assumption A1, if a buyer deviates and ad-
dresses ﬁrm E, entry does not follow. The deviant buyer should resort to the incumbent
at t4 paying w
m
I ≥ wI.
If wI < w
m
I no equilibrium exists where S ∈ (0,N
∗). The entrant does not enter and
buyers choosing it will pay w
m
I at t4. Any of these buyers would prefer to buy from
the incumbent immediately.
Instead, if wI = w
m
I , any S ∈ (0,N
∗) represents an equilibrium. Any buyer choosing the
entrant (and paying w
m
I ), pays the same price switching to the incumbent. Similarly,
any buyer choosing the incumbent.
2. Consider now wE = wI.
Any S ∈ (N
∗,N] is an equilibrium. Entry follows. Any buyer would pay the same
price changing supplier.
If wI > w
m
I , S = N
∗ is an equilibrium. Entry does not follow. Any buyer choosing the
entrant (and paying w
m
I ), would pay a higher price buying immediately from I. Any
buyer choosing the incumbent would attract entry by switching to ﬁrm E and would
pay the same price. No equilibrium exists where S ∈ [0,N
∗) (see argument above).
If wI = w
m
I , buyers are completely indiﬀerent among the sellers and any S is an
equilibrium.
If wI < w
m
I , S = 0 is an equilibrium (see argument above). No equilibrium exists
where S ∈ (0,N
∗] (see argument above).
3. Finally, consider wE > wI.
No equilibrium exists where S ∈ (N
∗,N]. Entry follows. Any buyer addressing the
entrant pays a lower price switching to the incumbent.
If wI > w
m
I , S = N
∗ is an equilibrium (see argument above). No equilibrium exists
where S ∈ [0,N
∗) (see argument above).
Instead, if wI = w
m
I , any S ∈ [0,N
∗] represents an equilibrium. Any buyer which
switches to the incumbent pays the same price (wI = w
m
I ). Any buyer switching to the
entrant pays either the same price (if entry does not follow) or a higher price (if entry
follows).
If wI < w
m
I , S = 0 is an equilibrium (see argument above). No equilibrium exists
where S ∈ (0,N
∗] (see argument above).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
First note that an equilibrium where wE > wI and wI < w
m
I does not exist. In any contin-
uation equilibrium ﬁrm E does not enter the market. Hence, either the incumbent, or the
entrant have an incentive to deviate.
We now characterize the equilibrium solutions. According to the continuation equilibria










I ) is sustained as an equilibrium by having S = 0 following any bid where
wE < wI. The incumbent has no incentive to increase the price. In turn, ﬁrm E would not
obtain enough orders to enter the market by bidding a price diﬀerent from w
∗
E.
There exist also no-entry equilibria where w
∗
I = w < w
m
I . They are sustained by having
S = 0 following any bid where wE ≤ wI = w, while S = N following any bid wI > w and
wE ≤ wI. If so, the incumbent has no incentive to deviate and bid a price above w because
it would lose all buyers; the entrant has no incentive to change its bid because this would not
allow entry.
Note that a no-entry equilibrium where wI > w
m
I does not exist. Firm E would have
an incentive to deviate and slightly undercut the incumbent as this allows to capture all the
buyers.
Entry equilibria
First, ﬁrm E cannot enter the market if it bids a price wE > cI: the incumbent could proﬁtably
undercut and obtain all buyers. Firm E cannot enter the market if it bids a price wE ≤ cE
either: the demand of all buyers is not enough to cover the entry costs.
Equilibria where w
∗
E ∈ (cE,cI] and w
∗
I = wE with S = N are sustained by having S = N
following any bid where wE < wI. The entrant cannot deviate by increasing its price as it
would lose all orders. In turn, the incumbent is indiﬀerent between wI and any higher price
because no buyer would patronize it in any case; instead, it captures all buyers by decreasing





I = cI and S ∈ (N
∗,N) are sustained by having S = 0 following
wE < wI = cI and S = N following wI > wE = cI. Hence, the entrant has no incentive
to deviate by decreasing its price because it would lose all buyers; in turn, the incumbent
gets zero proﬁts either selling at the price cI to S buyers or increasing its price and losing all
buyers; it would earn negative proﬁts by decreasing its price. Note that no equilibria exist
where wE ∈ (cE,cI), wI = wE and S ∈ (N
∗,N): the incumbent makes negative proﬁts by
selling to some buyers at a price below cI and has incentive to deviate to a price suﬃciently
high to make all buyers address the entrant.
Finally, there exist also entry equilibria where wI > wE: w
∗





They are sustained by having S = N following any bid where wI ≥ w
∗
E and S = 0 following
any bid where w
∗
I ≥ wE > w. In this case, ﬁrm E cannot increase its payoﬀ by increasing
the price and setting it equal or lower than the incumbent’s because it would lose all the
buyers. Note that equilibria of this type where wI > w
m
I do not exist. The entrant would
have incentive to deviate and increase its price.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
First, let us solve for equilibrium quantities in the ﬁnal market. Given the price wi paid for





where pi(.) is given by (2). Solving the system of FOCs ∂πi/∂qi = 0 with i = 1,..,n, and
focusing on the case where n−1 buyers pay the same price wI for the input and the remaining




(µ + 1)[(2n(1 − wE) + µ(1 + n(wI − wE) − wI)]





(µ + 1)[(2n(1 − wI) + µ(1 + wE − 2wI)]









2(n + µ)wI − 2n − µ
µ
(7)
The r.h.s. of condition (7) is (strictly) increasing in µ.










(wI − cI)(1 − wI)n(µ + 1)










(µ + 1)[(2n(1 − wE) + µ(1 + n(wI − wE) − wI)]



















E,wI,µ,n) ≥ 0 for any wI ∈ [cI,w
m
I ], µ and n. Since wI < 1
w
∗
E is (weakly) decreasing in µ. Moreover, the r.h.s. of (7) is (strictly) increasing in µ. Hence,
if
1 + wI(n − 1)
2n
≥ 2wI − 1, (11)







E satisﬁes condition (7) for any µ. Since the r.h.s. of (12) is (strictly) decreasing in n
and since cI < 1/3 implies that w
m
I < 2/3, it follows that condition (12) is satisﬁed for any
wI ∈ [cI,w
m
I ] and any n.
By (10), when it bids a lower price than the incumbent and it is selected by the deviant
buyer only, the entrant cannot earn more than:
π
∗d






E(wI,µ,n),wI,µ,n) − F (13)
Let us compute the derivatives of π
∗d
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(2n + µ)2(2n + µ + nµ)2 > 0





























(µ + 1)(n − 1)µ
(2n + µ)(2n + µ + nµ)
> 0 (16)
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(2n + µ)2(2n + µ + nµ)2 < 0
A.4 Proof of Lemma 3
Let the incumbent bid wI = w
m

















> F. Moreover, by Lemma 2, Π
∗d
E is strictly increasing






I ,µ,n) > F iﬀ µ > µ
∗(F,n). Trivially, µ
∗(F,n) is strictly increasing in F.
By Lemma 2, Π
∗d
E is strictly increasing in wI. It follows that
Π
∗d
E (wI,µ,n) ≤ F for any µ ≤ µ
∗(F,n) and wI ≤ w
m
I (19)














Simple algebra shows that limµ→∞ Π
∗d
E (cI,µ,n) < F. Moreover, limµ→∞ Π
∗d
E (cI,µ,n) > F iﬀ
































. Also, when cI > b cI denote as b F the value of the entry
cost F such that F = limµ→∞ Π
∗d
E (cI,µ,n). By deﬁnition, b F ∈ (F,F).
Case I: cI > b cI and F < b F.
By deﬁnition of Case I, limµ→∞ Π
∗d
E (cI,µ,n) > F. Moreover, by assumption A1, Π
∗d
E (cI,0,n) <
F. Hence, there exists a threshold µ
∗∗(F,n) such that Π
∗d




E is strictly increasing in wI. It follows that
Π
∗d
E (wI,µ,n) > F for any µ > µ




∗∗(F,n) is strictly increasing in F.






I ,µ,n) > F while Π
∗d
E (cI,µ,n) ≤ F. Since Π
∗d
E is strictly
increasing in wI, there exists a price w
ex
I (µ,F,n) ∈ [cI,w
m
I ) such that
Π
∗d





E is strictly increasing in µ, the price w
ex
I is strictly decreasing in µ. Moreover,
it is strictly increasing in F.
Case II: either cI ≤ b cI and F ∈ [F,F) or cI > b cI and F ≥ b F.










E is strictly increasing in µ, Π
∗d
E (cI,µ,n) ≤ F for any µ. As proved above, there
exists a price w
ex
I (µ,F,n) ∈ [cI,w
m
I ) such that
Π
∗d





I is strictly decreasing in µ, and it is strictly increasing in F.







I ,µ,n) = F. By Lemma 2, Π
∗d
E is (strictly) decreasing in n
and (strictly) increasing in µ. It follows that µ
∗ is (strictly) increasing in n.
The argument which shows that µ
∗∗ is (strictly) increasing in n follows the same logic.




E (wI,µ,n) = F. By Lemma 2, Π
∗d
E is (strictly) decreasing
in n and (strictly) increasing in wI. It follows that w
ex
I is (strictly) increasing in n.
20A.6 Proof of Proposition 3
Denote with cE the price such that cE(1 − cE) = F. By assumption A1, cE < cI.
Let the incumbent bid wI > cE. We now show that there exists at least a price w
0
E < wI
such that, if all buyers but one choose the incumbent, entry is proﬁtable. This implies that if
the entrant bids that price, in the continuation game coordination failures do not occur and
ﬁrm E attracts all the orders.
Speciﬁcally, consider wI ∈ (cE,1/2+
√
2/4] and let w
0
E be slightly lower. Let all buyers but
one choose the incumbent. If entry occurs, the buyer which is supplied by the entrant slightly
undercuts all its downstream rivals and sells 1 − wI units of the product. (When µ → ∞,
demand in the ﬁnal market is given by p = 1 − q.) Thus, by selling to the deviant buyer, the
entrant earns πE = wI(1 − wI) > F for any wI ∈ (cE,1/2 +
√





Now consider wI > 1/2 +
√
2/4 and wE = 1/2 < wI. Let all buyers but one choose
the incumbent. If entry occurs, the buyer which is supplied by the entrant sets the price
p = (1 + wE)/2 = 3/4 < wI and sells 1 − p = 1/4 units of the product. Thus, by selling to





By the previous argument, no-entry equilibria with wI > cE do not exist as the entrant
has incentive to deviate and bid w
0
E. The entrant’s deviation attracts all the orders and is
proﬁtable. No-entry equilibria where wI < cE do not exist either. Now the entrant has no
incentive to deviate and undercut the incumbent. However, in a no-entry equilibrium the
incumbent would be addressed by all buyers and would suﬀer losses. Hence, it would have
incentive to deviate.
To sum up, no-entry equilibria do not exist.




I ∈ (cE,cI], S = N.
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